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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a security protocol for 
advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) in smart grid. AMI is 
one of the important components in smart grid and it suffers from 
various vulnerabilities due to its uniqueness compared with wired 
networks and traditional wireless mesh networks. Our proposed 
security protocol for AMI includes initial authentication, secure 
uplink data aggregation/recovery, and secure downlink data 
transmission. Compared with existing researches in such area, 
our proposed security protocol let the customers be treated fairly, 
the privacy of customers be protected, and the control messages 
from the service provider be delivered safely and timely. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In smart grid, security issues are more important than those 
in traditional power grid since the communication network 
has been updated to bidirectional and the data is transmitted 
in much larger quantity and more frequently [1, 2]. An 
advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is the system that 
collects and analyzes data from smart meters, and giving 
intelligent management of various power-related applications 
and services based on that data [3]. An AMI is basically a 
wireless mesh network (WMN) where each smart meter is a 
node, a data aggregate node (DAP) which usually locates in 
the center of a neighborhood functions as the gateway of all 
the smart meters in that neighborhood [4, 5]. The smart meters 
connect the meter data management system (MDMS) through 
the DAP in multi-hop mode, and the DAP connects to the 
MDMS through a backbone network (e.g., optical fiber). 
In AMI, the data in uplink transmission from smart meters 
to the MDMS includes secret information, for example, the 
power usage of a household. Those data will be collected by 
the MDMS and be further applied to determine the power 
generation and the usage of renewable energy. The control data 
in downlink transmission involves the price and tariff informa-
tion, which affect the demand side response and finally lead 
to a more efficient power grid [6, 7]. Although AMI appears 
to be a WMN and security issues have been widely discussed 
for traditional WMN [8-10], however, AMI is different from 
traditional WMN mainly in threefold. First, each smart meter 
must be available and be treated equally in the network since 
fairness must be applied to each of the customers while 
traditional WMN does not emphasize availability for each 
wireless node let alone fairness. Second, the deployment of 
smart meters are fixed and in specific orders since they are 
deployed in each household and the houses are in fixed 
position in most cases, while the wireless nodes in traditional 
WMN are usually deployed randomly and redundantly. Third, 
the uplink transmission and downlink transmission in AMI are 
asymmetric where the uplink transmission consists of different 
data from each smart meter to the MDMS and the most of 
the downlink transmissions are in broadcast mode, while in 
traditional WMN, the uplink or downlink can even barely be 
distinguished. Thus the security protocols must be redesigned 
to fit the uniqueness of AMI. 
There are several researches for the security issues in 
AMI [11-14], however, there are very few comprehensive 
security protocols for AMI. In [14], the authors proposed a 
protocol called integrated authentication and confidentiality (I-
AC) which involves the initial authentication of a smart meter, 
and the security in both uplink and downlink transmissions. 
However, IAC has several problems to be addressed. 1) The 
smart meters are not treated equally where some of them are 
chosen to be the backbone nodes and proceed with security 
protocol, while the others must go through the backbone 
nodes however the backbone nodes selection does not have 
any security concern. 2) The initial authentication process 
cannot prevent replay attack or even forgery if the initial 
request is overheard by the attacker. 3) The security protocol 
in uplink transmission cannot handle multiple incoming data 
at an intermediate node. 4) Compromise of a node will at least 
endangers another node since they share the same secret key 
for message encryption. 5) The security protocol for downlink 
transmission is too complicated since IAC did not consider 
broadcast scenario as the main transmission mode for down-
link. 6) Once a node malfunctions in the network, IAC cannot 
function any longer. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive 
security protocol which addresses those shortages in IAC while 
maintaining the good security features. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 
II, we present the studied network model and discuss the 
recovery of malfunctioning nodes. In section III, we present 
the proposed security protocol for AMI. In section IV, we show 
the results of performance analysis. In section V, we give the 
conclusion and future work. 
II. NETWORK MODEL 
Let a conflict graph Q = (V,£) be the wireless mesh 
network of AMI, where each node n¿ E V (other than the 
final gateway which is a DAP) is a smart meter, an edge is 
a communication link for the two corresponding nodes. In 
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the studied AMI, there are two types of nodes, one is active 
and the other is uninitialized. An active node is a node such 
that it has been authenticated by the authentication server 
(AS) to join the AMI communication and is functioning in 
a healthy status. An uninitialized node is (but not limited 
to) the newly installed one. If a node has recovered from 
malfunctioning status, or updated, or lost connection to all 
of its active neighbors, or moved to another location, it is also 
defined as uninitialized. An example of such network is shown 
in Fig. 1, where the DAP functions as a gateway and the AS. 
6 V r \ \ 
f 16) 
Fig. 1. An example of the conflict graph Q. 
Routing in the uplink transmission is achieved by building 
a shortest path routing tree based on all the active nodes in the 
conflict graph. Finding the shortest path for every active node 
to the DAP can be achieved using any well-know algorithm 
such as Dijkstra's algorithm [15]. Assuming all the nodes in 
G are active, we then show one routing example as a rooted 
shortest path tree in Fig. 2. Note that the parent node is always 
initialized before its child nodes, details will be discussed in 
section III. 
Fig. 2. The corresponding rooted spanning tree T. 
A. Uplink Transmission Recovery 
Since the proposed security protocol is for an AMI network 
in operations, once the network is broken due to some mal-
functioning nodes, the network must be recovered before the 
secure transmission recovers. In this subsection, we discuss 
the recovery of the uplink transmission. In the shortest path 
routing tree, once a node failure occurs, the links connecting its 
child nodes will break. Therefore the child nodes should refer 
to the conflict graph G and look for the active neighbors which 
are not descendent in the shortest path tree reroute themselves 
through the closest ones to the DAP. 
Malfunctioning 
Fig. 3. Example of routing recovery when 7113 malfunctions. 
An example of malfunctioning 7743 is shown in Fig. 3. 
Assuming that n17 is initialized before ni8 , which enables 
nig to be the child node of nyj without initialization. The 
same assumption applies to n$ and 7114 where n$ is initialized 
before 7744. Once 7743 is down, links (13,18) and (13,14) no 
longer exist. Then, nig will reroute itself through nyj and 7744 
will reroute itself through 779, no other nodes need to change 
in the rerouting process. Once 7743 recovers, it will start the 
initialization process and directly connect to the AP. nig and 
77i4 will discover their new shortest path through 7713 and start 
the initialization process again in order to reroute through it. 
16 21 ; 22 10 4 23 24\ 19 20 ) 15 
5 ' ( 2 5 Reroute 
Fig. 4. First step of routing recovery when m 3 malfunctions where ms 
cannot reroute through 7117. 
If nig is initialized before 7717, then mg is not allowed to 
connect to 7717 without initialization. The descendent nodes 
of nig (^23, ^24 and 7725) will reroute themselves to their 
active neighbors (as illustrated in Fig. 4). Once nig finishes 
the initialization and connects to 7747, there is no need for n23 
or 7724 to reconnect to ni 8 since the distance will be the same. 
If later on nig reconnects with 7713, 7723 and 7724 will start 
initialization again in order to route through 77is for shortest 
path to the AS. 
The worst case is that there exists no available route without 
going backwards (through child nodes), all the nodes in the 
sub-rooted tree with root ni 8 will then start initialization 
process until all of them have connection to the AS. In order 
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to insure the recovery process of most situations, the conflict 
graph G should have connectivity constraints, for example, the 
smallest degree of a node δ > 3. However, this connectivity 
issue is beyond the scope of this paper, we assume that 
each node should at least have connection with its physical 
neighbors and the neighborhood follows grid (or pseudo-grid) 
topology and thus the connectivity is good enough. 
III. PROPOSED SECURITY PROTOCOL FOR AMI 
A. Initial Authentication 
There are two types of nodes in the AMI, one is active 
and the other is uninitialized. An active node is a node such 
that it has been authenticated by the AS to join the AMI 
communication and is functioning in a healthy status. An 
uninitialized node is (but not limited to) the newly installed 
one. If a node has recovered from malfunctioning status, or 
updated, or lost connection to all of its active neighbors, or 
moved to another location, it is also defined as uninitialized 
and thus must start the initial authentication process to join the 
AMI. Whatever status it is, an uninitialized node that does not 
function in the AMI properly must be authenticated through 
the initialization process. 
Active neighbor n4 
Fig. 5. Initial authentication process. 
For example, if n\ wants to join the AMI, the initialization 
process goes through all of its active neighbors (e.g., n2, n3 
and 77,4). As illustrated in Fig. 5, n\ sends requests to the AS 
through all of its active neighbors, and receives different reply 
messages from the AS through its active neighbors as well. 
Through this initial authentication process, there are mainly 
three tasks accomplished, 
• n\ is authenticated to be an active node and join the AMI; 
• n\ establishes secure connection to the AS through one 
of its active neighbors which has the shortest distance to 
the AS; 
• ni establishes backup secure connection to the AS 
through the rest of its active neighbors. 
The initial authentication process through each active neigh­
bor is similar, we give a detailed illustration of the process 
through one active neighbor (e.g., n2). Throughout the process, 
there are mainly three entities involved, n\, n2 and the AS, 
although it is possible that other nodes are involved for 
relaying the message, however they do not affect the process 
as long as they relay the message correctly since they do 
not get new information from either communications. Among 
the three entities, there are three mutual authentications to be 
achieved in order to guarantee the security, one is between m 
and the AS, one is between n2 and the AS, and the other one 
is between m and n2. The mutual authentication between m 
and the AS is obvious since the AS will only allow genuine 
node join the AMI and the node will also trust the AS. The 
mutual authentication between n2 and the AS is to ensure that 
n2 is active and is trusted to relay the request from n\. The 
mutual authentication between m and n2 is to help further 
establish secure communications from n\ to n2. It is assumed 
that each node has a pre-shared secret key (e.g., K\ for node 
ni and if2 for node n2) with the AS before initialization. 
Each active node has been assigned with an active secret key 
(e.g., fc2 for n2) mainly for uplink data encryption, this active 
secret key is also used to verify if this node is active or not. 
Similar to if2, &2 is only known to n2 and the AS. In order 
to establish a secure connection from m to the AS, an active 
secret key fci must be generated by the AS and assigned to n\ 
during the initialization process. Note that n\ does not bare 
fci before initialization process, only K\ is known to n\. 
Uninitialized 7^ Active neighbor n2 AS 
(\ °P.99PJ?-9P Γ \ f\ °P.9.9.PJ?-9P 
Mi = requestl \ΙΏΧ\\ H{ID1 + Kt) 
Μ5=Μ3\\Ρη2Λ 
M6=EPu21(Puí¡2) 
M3 
M2 = Ek2{M1\\ID21 \HQD2+K2)) 
= EKlUV1\\ki\\K[\\HOD2+kO\\PuAS\\p\\g) 
M4 = Ek2(M3\\p\\g) 
Fig. 6. Detailed initial authentication process through one active neighbor. 
As shown in Fig. 6, the whole initialization process involves 
5 hand-shakes and 6 messages. In the first hand-shake between 
n\ and n2, n\ sends M\ = request]\IDi\\H(IDi + K{) to 
the AS through n2, where H(·) is a simple hash function, and 
' + ' is XOR. H(IDi + ifi) is used to provide authentication 
of ni at the AS side since the AS is the only one besides n\ 
to compute the hash value. 
In the second hand-shake, n2 appends H (ID2 + if 2) to 
Mi which is used for the AS to authenticate n2 as a genuine 
node, n2 then encrypts the entire message and appended its 
own identification with fc2, it is used to protect its identity 
verification code H (ID2 + if 2) a nd also let the AS authen-
ticate its active status. The message send from n2 to the AS 
is M2 = ID2\\Ek2(M1\\H(ID2 + if2)), where Ek(·) is the 
encryption function with key fc. 
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Fig. 7. Data aggregation process in uplink transmission. 
MN=MN_1\\CN\\H*(CN) 
À 
T 
PrN,AS 
AS 
Once the AS receives M2, it authenticates 77,2 by decrypting 
M2 using fc2 and compute H(ID2 + K2). The AS then 
authenticate n\ by computing H(IDi + K\). Once ni is 
authenticated, the AS generates an initial vector IV\ for further 
uplink transmission, an active secret key k±, a new K[ to 
replace K\ for further initial authentication of m since Mi 
was transmitted unprotected and H{IDi+K{) as a verification 
code is revealed (note that H(ID2+K2) is encrypted and thus 
K2 is not required to update). Public key of the AS Pu AS is 
sent to ni for further downlink transmission protocols. The AS 
also generates H(ID2 + ki) for m to authenticate n2. Finally, 
the AS generates p, g for public key generation between m 
and n2. It is possible for the AS to generate the public keys 
or session keys for m and n2 if the devices are not advanced 
enough to finish the tasks, however, it is safer to keep the 
nodes as independent as possible to other nodes and the AS. 
Therefore, let n\ and n2 generate their own public/private keys 
or session keys within one-hop transmission is recommended 
in this protocol. In summary, the message sent from the AS 
t o n 1 i s M 3 = ^ 1 ( / V i | | f e i | | K i | | ^ ( / ^ 2 + fei)||P[/A5|W^). 
Since M3 is relayed by n2, the AS appends p, g to M3 and 
encrypts it by k2 so that n2 can follow the public/private key 
generation of n\. Overall, the message sent from the AS to 
n2 in the third hand-shake is M4 = Ek2(M3\\p\\g). 
After n2 receives M4 = Ek2(Ms\\p\\g), it decrypts M4 
to authenticate the AS and get p, g. Based on p, g, n2 
generates a pair of public/private keys Pu2,1/Pr2fu and sends 
M5 = M3||Pt¿2,i to n\ in the fourth hand-shake. Until now, 
n\ has received all the information from the AS and is just 
one step from being an active node if it wants to route through 
n2. Based on p, g, n\ generates a pair of public/private keys 
Puiy2/Priy2, and sends MQ = EpU21 (Puiy2) to n2 in the fifth 
hand-shake. Note that Pui¿ is sent in a secure way since it 
is encrypted with Pu2^. Although Pu2 ,i is sent in plaintext, 
only n2 is able to reveal the public key of n\. After n2 receives 
Pu 1,2? both Pu2ii/Pr2ii will be discarded. 
Until now, m is fully initialized and it is able to join 
uplink communications through n2. The initial authentication 
processes through other active neighbors are similar, the AS 
sends back the same IVi, fci, K[, PUAS, V and g. In the 
final hand-shake, n\ will send the same Pu\yX to node nx 
encrypted with PuXy\. By doing so, m shares the same 
public key to all of its active neighbors. Therefore, ni is 
able to join the uplink transmission through any of the active 
neighbors, in other words, both operating and backup secure 
communication channels are established through the initial 
authentication process. 
1) Security Analysis: Confidentiality of the authentication 
request is unnecessary, therefore it is not provided. Applying 
this protocol makes a genuine node unforgeable. As discussed 
before, the initial authentication of n¿ relies on the pre-shared 
key Ki, which cannot be forged since it is pre-installed in 
both the AS and m. On the other hand, Although the request 
and valid verification code can be overheard, however the 
information is useless since Ki is subject to change after each 
successful initial authentication. Therefore, reply attack will 
not harm the initial authentication as well. 
B. Security Protocol in Uplink Transmission 
In the uplink transmission, data from each node is aggre-
gated in a chain topology and is finally delivered to the DAP. 
Among all the security requirements, data confidentiality is the 
most important issue for the uplink data. Data integrity is also 
very important since the wrong data may cause unnecessary 
loss of the power generation. Sender authentication shall be 
considered as well if there is enough computational resources 
since the nodes shall only aggregate the data sent from active 
nodes. To achieve all those requirements mentioned above, we 
propose the security protocol for data aggregation in uplink 
transmission as shown in Fig. 7. Suppose in one path there 
are N nodes with an order of (ni, n 2 , . . . , TIN)· AS the first 
one of the aggregation, m mixes its raw data D\ with IV\ 
and encrypts it with k\ so that confidentiality can be achieved. 
H*(·) is a hashed message authentication code function which 
provides data integrity. Finally, n\ signs the total message with 
Pi¿i,2 so that n2 can verify that the data is from m which is an 
active node. The intermediate nodes first decrypt the incoming 
data with the private key of the child node and mix their raw 
data with the previous data and then follow the same steps as 
the first node. 
If an intermediate node has multiple child nodes, it treats 
each of them as a separate chain and aggregates its own data 
to one of the incoming data while simply padding the data 
from the other child nodes to it with flags. The details are 
shown in Fig. 8. Assume np has two child nodes n¿ and n¿, 
and np chooses to aggregate incoming data from n¿. Then 
np follows the usual steps dealing with Dp and MiyP. For 
MjyP, np authenticates the sender by getting MJ5 and simply 
flags Mj such that / 0 | |Mj | | / i to the original Mp, thus Mp = 
¡ο\\ΜΜ\Ορ\\Η*(Ορ). 
Once the AS receives the aggregated data, it starts the 
recovery process of the data. The AS first authenticates the 
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Fig. 8. Multi-flow data aggregation process. 
child node by decrypting the receiving data with the pre-shared 
public key PUNIAS- Before recovering the raw data, the AS 
needs to verify the data integrity by the process shown in 
Fig.9. Since the data of each node are not further processed 
by nodes after it, if some of the data corrupt, the AS will 
simply discard them instead of wasting the whole message 
from that transmission path. 
m-
Fig. 9. Data integrity check in uplink transmission. 
The detailed raw data recovery process (without 
tegrity check) is shown in Fig. 10. Message M¿ = 
M¿_i||C¿||i/*(C¿), after verifying the data integrity, the AS 
decrypts C¿ and XOR the result with M¿_i to recover DN. 
Note that D\ is recovered by XOR 1V\. If the message in-
cludes data from multiple chains, the AS extracts the message 
between f0 and j \ first and recovers the data following the 
same process as shown in Fig. 10 without verifying the sender 
authentication (the decryption process with PUNKAS)· 
1) Security Analysis: Confidentiality is provided by mixing 
the raw data with previous incoming data and encryption with 
active secure key. The message cannot be manipulated since 
message integrity is verified using HMAC. The message is 
unforgeable unless a node is totally compromised since the 
HMAC and encryption must use both K and k. The message 
is non-repudiable since it is signed with a private key of the 
sender. 
C. Security Protocol in Downlink Transmission 
The downlink transmission involves control messages from 
the DAP to the nodes. Most of the control messages (e.g., 
price and tariff information) are for all the smart meters in the 
neighborhood, where the confidentiality is not as important as 
that of the uplink data. However, message integrity is impor-
tant. Message manipulation will cause further responding in 
power usage and will finally result in unnecessary over- or 
under-power generation. Let CB be the control message to be 
broadcast. To provide message integrity, a MAC (achieved by 
HMAC function H*) is appended to the original message, the 
entire message is then signed with Pu AS as digital signature 
to provide non-repudiation and sender authentication. In all, 
MB=EPUAS(CB\\H*(CB)). 
Some of the control messages (e.g., request for update) are 
for a specific node (e.g., n¿), let such control message be 
Ci. Apparently, message integrity, non-repudiation and sender 
authentication shall still be provided, moreover, confidentiality 
of the message is also important, therefore the message is en-
crypted with ki such that MB = EPuAS(Ekt(CB\\H*(CB))). 
Unlike MB, broadcasting M¿ is a waste of resource and is 
unnecessary. However, sending Mi through the corresponding 
uplink path may reduce the availability of the message. There-
fore, we propose to send such specific control message to n¿ 
through all of its active neighbors. For example (regarding 
to Fig. 1 and Fig. 2), if specific control message M23 is to 
be transmitted to 77,23, the AS will send it to nig, 77,22 and 
77,24 which are active neighbors of 7723, all of them will then 
forward M23 to 7723. The downlink transmission of M23 is 
shown in Fig. 11. 
( DAP j 
13 
A /K / 
Í 1 6 11 17 9 2 3 Í 18 J /AX /Λ 
16 21 ) (22 10 4 23 - 24 19 20 15 
\ ( 5 ) / 25 : 
Fig. 11. Example routing of downlink message C23. 
1) Security Analysis: First of all, the control message is 
unforgeable since it is signed by the AS. For the same 
reason, the control message is also non-repudiable. The control 
message cannot be manipulated since HMAC is applied for 
data integrity. For downlink transmission to a specific node, 
confidentiality is provided by encrypting the message with the 
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DN 
Fig. 10. Data recovery process in uplink transmission. 
N,AS 
pre-shared key. Moreover, the harm of DoS is reduced by 
increasing of availability and delivering the control message 
through multiple paths for both broadcasting control message 
and specific control message. 
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
The most important improvement in the proposed security 
protocol compared with IAC is the uplink recovery process, 
we then focus on the comparison of the recovery performance. 
The analyzed network is Q shown in Fig. 1 and the shortest 
path routing tree T is shown in Fig. 2. In Fig. 12(a) we 
show the average steps of recovering the uplink connection 
w.r.t the number of malfunctioning nodes. Since IAC must 
recover all the nodes that are prior to a malfunctioning node 
while our proposed scheme focuses on the child nodes of 
the malfunctioning node only, it is obvious that the average 
recovery steps can be lower. 
¿-24&V 
Ι - Θ - I A C 
| - B - Proposed scheme 
1 
,&'~~ 
y JJ-~ 
À 
■■■-¿■»è'' 
: É 
„ , - B ;"" 
Number of malfunctioning nodes.) 
(a) Average steps of recovery. 
Number of malfunctioning nodes. 
(b) Average available nodes. 
Fig. 12. Network performance in connection recovery. 
On the other hand, Fig. 12(b) shows the number of available 
nodes after the recovery of the connection. We can see that 
both the proposed scheme and IAC perform the same. When 
the number of malfunctioning nodes is 1, all the other nodes 
will not be affected after the recovery process. However, when 
the number of malfunctioning nodes grows to 2 or more, it 
is not guaranteed that all the other nodes can get access to 
the MDMS through the DAP since the node-connectivity of 
K(G) = 2. In order to improve the availability, the connectivity 
issue will be considered in the future work by adding multiple 
DAPs or dummy nodes. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we propose a comprehensive security protocol 
for AMI which includes the initial authentication of a smarter 
meter, secure uplink data aggregation/recovery, and secure 
downlink data transmission. Compared with existing IAC 
protocol, our proposed protocol addresses several concerns 
and achieves fairness for each smart meter in AMI. In the 
future work, we will focus on deploying an intrusion detection 
system to monitor the active nodes which will further enhance 
the security in AMI. 
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